SONJA F. BIVINS, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Eula W. Rivers ("Plaintiff") brings this action seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et. seq., and 1381, et. seq. On March 26, 2012, the parties consented to have the undersigned conduct any and all proceedings in this case. (Doc. 17). Thus, the action was referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 18). Oral argument was waived. Upon careful consideration of the administrative record and the arguments and briefs of the parties, it is hereby
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on October 24, 2007. (Tr. 133). Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since May 9, 2007, due to degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and lumbar spine. (Id. at 64). Plaintiff's applications were denied at the initial stage. (Id. at 60-66). She filed a timely Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id. at 67-68). On August 3, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Renee Hagler held an administrative hearing, which was attended by Plaintiff, her attorney, and vocational expert, Jody Skinner. (Id. at 34-59). On August 19, 2009, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 23-33). Plaintiff's request for review was denied by the Appeals Council ("AC") on May 13, 2011, and upon review of additional evidence, the AC again denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 9, 2011. (Id. at 1-22).
The parties agree that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
Plaintiff was born on June 17, 1960, and was forty-nine (49) years of age at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr. 39, 60-61, 112). Plaintiff has an eighth grade education and past relevant work ("PRW") as a dump truck driver. (Id. at 31, 39, 153, 157).
At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she currently works five (5) days a week, between two (2) and four (4) hours a day cleaning motel rooms. (Id. at 40-41). Plaintiff further testified that prior to her work cleaning motel rooms, she worked in May 2007 driving a dump truck. (Id. at 41-42). According to Plaintiff, she is unable to work full-time due to pain in her neck and back. (Id. at 45). Plaintiff also testified that she has pain generating down into her right arm and her legs, that she is
Plaintiff further testified that she is able to grip a coffee cup or a door handle, that she can pick up small items such as an ink pen with each hand, that she can lift a gallon of milk and grocery shop, that she can prepare a simple meal for herself, that she can bathe, dress, and comb her hair without assistance, that she can make a bed, and that she can drive. (Id. at 50-53). According to Plaintiff, she cannot climb stairs, bend over, stoop or squat, and her grandson assists with household chores such as sweeping and vacuuming. (Id.).
In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court's role is a limited one. The Court's review is limited to determining 1) whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence and 2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.1990).
An individual who applies for Social Security disability benefits must prove his disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. Disability is defined as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a claimant has proven her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (hereinafter "RFC") to perform light work, that Plaintiff can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, that Plaintiff can sit, stand, and walk for 6 out of 8 hours, and that Plaintiff needs to alternate positions every 2 hours. (Id. at 29).
The ALJ next determined that while Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms were not credible. (Id. at 30). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's RFC precludes her from performing any of her past work. (Id. at 31). Relying on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff's RFC and vocational factors, such as age, education and work experience, Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy such as cashier, information clerk, and assembler. (Id. at 32). The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 33).
The relevant medical evidence reflects that Plaintiff was treated by Drs. Tim Revels and Roger M. Setzler (with Alabama Orthopedic Clinic) from July 2005 through July 2007 for back and neck pain. (Id. at 226-51). In July 2005, Plaintiff reported long term back pain, which had gotten worse over the last four or five months. She also reported low back pain, tightness in muscles, and pain running down the right leg. On exam, Dr. Setzler found Plaintiff was intact neurologically in both upper and lower extremities with normal reflexes, normal sensation, and normal strength, and that Plaintiff exhibited low back and cervical tenderness. (Id. at 232).
X-rays of Plaintiff's cervical and lumbar spine showed "marked" degenerative changes throughout, specifically some fairly marked narrowing at L5-S1 of the facets and narrowing of C5-6. Dr. Setzler diagnosed Plaintiff with lumbar pain, cervical pain, degenerative joint disease, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. (Id.). Toradol 30mg was recommended, and Plaintiff was prescribed Celebrex, 200 grams a day. (Id.).
During a July 28, 2005 visit, Plaintiff complained that she had been "miserable",
During her next visit on August 15, 2005, Dr. Setzler scheduled Plaintiff for a cervical steroid epidural bloc at C5-6. (Id. at 229). During Plaintiff's September 1, 2005 visit, she reported some improvement with neck pain and numbness, but the tingling in her arm remained. Dr. Setzler recommended a shot of Depo-Medrol, and noted that the epidural block may need to be repeated in a couple of weeks. (Id. at 228). The September 19, 2005 notes reflect that Plaintiff "has been actually doing pretty well, but then started having a lot more trouble after the storm." (Id. at 227). The treatment notes also reflect that the epidural block had not helped as much as hoped and that Plaintiff suffered a fall, wherein she injured her ribs, but did not have any fractures. Another cervical steroid epidural block at C5-6 was recommended. (Id.).
In the notes dated November 16, 2005, Dr. Revels observed that Plaintiff had tried epidurals, careful modified lifestyle, physical therapy, and various medications with no improvement of her symptoms, and as a result, he discussed with her the options of pain management versus surgery, which would involve a C5-6 anterior cervical discectomy and fusion (ACDF). (Id. at 241). The November 30, 2005 treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff elected to proceed with the ACDF surgical procedure, and that Dr. Revels provided her with a work slip excusing her from her job for two months. (Id. at 240).
On January 10, 2006, Dr. Revels, with Dr. Setzler assisting, performed a C5-6 ACDF surgical procedure. The procedure included C5-6 anterior decompression and fusion with interbody prosthetic bone graft, C5-6 anterior spinal instrumentation, and bone marrow aspiration, left hip. (Id. at 242-44). During a follow-up visit on February 2, 2006, Dr. Revels noted that the x-rays showed good placement of the bone graft and hardware with no complications. Dr. Revels observed that Plaintiff has "greatly" improved right arm radiculopathy and presented with only tightness, neck pain, spasm, and stiffness. Dr. Revels recommended outpatient physical therapy and a RS medical stimulator. (Id. at 239).
On March 8, 2006, Plaintiff reported that she was a passenger in a motor vehicle accident, which resulted in aggravation of her neck pain. Dr. Revels' notes reflect that "was making an improvement until the ... MVA." He recommended that Plaintiff continue with outpatient physical therapy, and he provided her a work slip indicating that she could return to her work as a dump truck driver the next day. (Id. at 238).
Plaintiff was next seen by Dr. Revels on March 17, 2006, with complaints of post-operative bilateral severe neck pain, left more than right, resulting from a motor vehicle accident, and recurrent numbness and pain in her right arm. X-rays of her back were taken and they showed no problems with the bone graft or hardware from her ACDF procedure. Dr. Revels recommended that Plaintiff undergo an MRI of
The MRI of her cervical spine was taken on March 25, 2006, and it revealed that the alignment and vertebral body height were well preserved, that mild disc desiccation is present to the visualized cervical spine, that the signal within the spinal cord of the cervical spine appeared within normal limits, and that there was continued mucosal thickening within the maxillary sinuses and ethmoid air cells, similar to the previous MRI exam. (Id. at 250-51).
In a visit on April 5, 2006, Plaintiff reported neck pain with some pain down the right lateral forearm into the base of the wrist and thumb, and left forearm and fourth and fifth finger numbness. On physical exam, Dr. Revels observed "findings of developing de Quervain's tenosynovitis
Dr. Revels referred Plaintiff to Dr. Charles Hall for the EMG and NVC. The tests were performed on April 16, 2006, and Dr. Hall reported that the results were normal, with no definite evidence of a focal or generalized peripheral neuropathy in the left upper extremity. (Id. at 245-49).
Treatment notes dated April 26, 2006 reflect that Plaintiff attempted to return to work for a few days. She reported aggravation of her neck and required an injection. She was provided a work slip excusing her from work for another month. Dr. Revels noted that he would try to get her back to work. (Id. at 235).
During her May 24, 2006 visit, Plaintiff continued to report neck pain and stiffness. She also advised Dr. Revels that she wanted to return to work in a week. Dr. Revels prescribed Neurontin to help her rest. (Id. at 234). In treatment notes dated July 5, 2006, Dr. Revels observed that Plaintiff had not gotten any better since surgery, that because she was doing a lot of shoveling upon returning to work, her symptoms had gotten worst, and she was "living on Lortab at this point to try to get by." He referred Plaintiff to Dr. Ruan for pain management. (Id. at 233).
Plaintiff was treated by Xiulu Ruan, M.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Ruan") for pain management from July 6, 2006 until through at least June 4, 2010. (Id. at 263-84, 298-302, 324-363). Dr. Ruan's July 6, 2006 notes reflect that on exam, Plaintiff's neck was supple and her range of motion in the cervical spine was moderately decreased with flexion, extension, and lateral bending. (Id. at 283-284). Tenderness with palpation over the cervical spine midline and facet joint was observed, and she had a positive Spurling test. Cervical paraspinal muscle spasm was also noted. Tenderness with palpation over thoracic and lumbar facet joint and mild tenderness with palpation over SI joint were also observed. Dr. Ruan's diagnosis was degenerative lumbar disc disease, lumbar spondylosis, lumbar radiculitis, rule out LE neuropathy, degenerative cervical disc disease, cervical dystonia/cervical myofascial pain syndrome, cervicogenic headache, cervical spondylosis with facet syndrome, cervical radiculitis, rule out entrapment neuropathy,
Dr. Ruan's treatment plan for Plaintiff included use of a multidisciplinary approach, specifically Lyrica 75 mg for neuropathic pain, Lortab, muscle relaxers, and TENS therapy. (Id.). Plaintiff was also scheduled for LE NCS/EMG to evaluate for LE neuropathy versus lumbosacral radiculopathy and for a cervical myobloc injection for her cervical dystonia. Plaintiff was also directed to continue her TENS therapy. (Id.)
The record reflects that Plaintiff received cervical myobloc injections
Plaintiff reported, during a visit on August 3, 2006, that Lyrica made her feel "drunk." (Id. at 273). During a September 28, 2006 visit, Plaintiff reported that her pain comes and goes but that it is worse at work, and that her current medications were not helping much. On exam, Plaintiff exhibited tenderness in the cervical spine and right trapezius muscle. Dr. Ruan provided her a sample of Provigil to try for a week. (Id. at 272). Dr. Ruan's treatment notes dated November 10, 2006 reflect that Plaintiff reported pain while turning her neck in her job as a dump truck driver. On exam, Plaintiff held her neck stiffly. She had tenderness on the right side of her neck down into her hand, and muscle spasm was noted. (Id. at 271).
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Ruan on January 9, 2007, and she reported that her right side neck pain increases more when she is working as a driver, that she had been experiencing low back pain for three days, and that she was having problems sleeping. She also reported that she was not receiving benefit from the myobloc injections, and that Indocin and Cymbalta made her feel sick. She was continued on Lortab, Ultram, Provigal, and Allegra. (Id. at 269).
The record also contains a letter from Dr. Ruan to Plaintiff's employer at the Mobile County Commission. The letter, which is dated May 12, 2007, reads, in pertinent part as follows:
(Id. at 267).
Dr. Ruan's treatment notes dated June 7, 2007 reflect that Plaintiff went back to work for three weeks, but upon getting a letter from Dr. Blessey, who is also treating Plaintiff, her employer would not allow her to return to work because Dr. Blessey opined that she could no longer drive, and he wants her to "get on disability." (Id. at 266).
In treatment notes dated July 12, 2007, Dr. Revels opined that because Plaintiff uses pain medication and muscle relaxants after work, in the evening, and when working, she only uses lidocaine patches, she should be able to return to work. (Id. at 226).
Plaintiff reported in a September 27, 2007 visit to Dr. Ruan that her employer would not let her return. She also reported numbness in her legs, that she had gone to the ER because of the numbness, and that the TENS therapy was helping with the numbness. (Id. at 264).
An MRI of her cervical spine on January 2, 2008 did not reveal any significant spinal canal or neural foraminal stenosis. (Id. at 301). Dr. Ruan's treatment notes dated April 16, 2008 reflect that Plaintiff reported she was having a hard time holding her head up straight after a fall two weeks prior. Dr. Ruan also noted that Plaintiff "wants desperately to go back to work." (Id. at 326). On exam, Plaintiff had a good range of motion when moving her head from side to side but had tenderness in the bilateral trapezius muscles. (Id.).
During Plaintiff's June 11, 2008 visit with Dr. Ruan, Plaintiff reported that she had been doing well until three weeks prior when she started to have right side pain again. She indicated that she had not been resting well because she awakens in pain although Dr. Ruan had prescribed Ambien for her. (Id. at 327).
Dr. Ruan's treatment notes dated December 17, 2008 reflect that Plaintiff reported a headache lasting three weeks. On exam, the right trapezius muscle was extremely tender to touch. Dr. Ruan started Plaintiff on a prescription of Prednisone, and referred her for an MRI of her brain due to her headache. (Id. at 331). The December 31, 2008 MRI findings showed no major vascular territory infarct was present within the brain and no mass effect or midline shift was seen to the brain. The physician reviewing the MRI observed that Plaintiff's current MRI was essentially normal. (Id. at 332).
That same day, an MRI of Plaintiff's cervical spine was done. The results revealed "[m]agnetic susceptibility is present from anterior cervical fixation plate at the C5-C6 level. Straightening is present to the normal lordotic curvature of the cervical spine. Mild disc desiccation is seen to the cervical spine with disc heights maintained. Signal within the spinal cord of the cervical spine is within normal limits." (Id. at 333).
An MRI of Plaintiff's thoracic spine was taken on July 16, 2009. The results revealed posterior focal disc herniation at T8-9 with anterior cord contact but no stenosis of the central canal, foramina, or cord compression. (Id. at 342). That same day, Plaintiff had another MRI of her cervical spine. The imaging results showed that at C3-4, disc desiccation with posterior disc bulge and facet hypertrophy were noted. Mild AP stenosis of 9.4 mm was observed. It was also noted that the stenosis was slightly more prominent than on prior exam. No other significant changes were seen. (Id. at 343).
A physical RFC was completed by Agency medical consultant Sheila Brody on February 1, 2008. (Id. at 316-23). Ms. Brody diagnosed Plaintiff with history of cervical fusion, hypertension, and vision loss. (Id. at 316). Ms. Brody opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 50 pounds, frequently lift 25 pounds, stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and push and/or pull for an unlimited amount of time. (Id. at 317). Additionally,
In her brief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's RFC determination, which indicated that Plaintiff is able to perform light work, is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that while the ALJ gave determinative weight to the opinions of Dr. Ruan and Dr. Revels, neither doctor completed a physical capacities assessment, nor did they give an opinion regarding Plaintiff's physical limitations. According to Plaintiff, there is "clear ambiguity and insufficiency" regarding her physical limitations, and the only physical capacities assessment in the record comes not from a treating or examining physician but from Sheila Brody, a non-examining Agency employee, who opined that Plaintiff can perform medium work. Plaintiff indicates that because the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing no more than light work, which is inconsistent with the Agency's physical capacities assessment, and because there is no assessment by a treating physician, the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff cites Coleman v. Barnhart, 264 F.Supp.2d 1007 (S.D.Ala.2003) in support of her argument. (Doc. 13 at 5-6).
In opposition, the Commissioner counters that Plaintiff bears the burden of proving disability and of providing evidence to be used in RFC assessments, and that RFC determinations are the province of the ALJ and are based on all relevant evidence and not just medical evidence. The Commissioner further contends that the Coleman decision cannot be reconciled with the applicable regulations, and that there is no requirement that the ALJ's assessment be based on the RFC assessment of a treating or examining source in every case. According to the Commissioner, the ALJ relied on evidence from Plaintiff's own physicians that she is able to work and such evidence demonstrates that the record was adequate for a determination of Plaintiff's abilities. (Doc. 14).
It is well established that a hearing before an ALJ in social security cases is inquisitorial and not adversarial. A claimant bears the burden of proving disability and for producing evidence in support of his claim while the ALJ has "a basic duty to develop a full and fair record." Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam); see also Ingram v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir.2007). This duty to develop the record exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel. Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir.1995). Indeed, applicable Social Security regulations provide that the Commissioner will pay the reasonable cost of providing existing medical records the Commissioner needs or requests. Hargove v. Astrue, 2012 WL 1815600, *10, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69821, *31 (N.D.Fla. Mar. 15, 2012). The ALJ's duty to develop the record is triggered when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Strawder v. Astrue, 2011 WL 5057201, *7, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122843, *20 (N.D.Fla. Aug. 8, 2011).
The responsibility for determining a plaintiff's RFC
The undersigned finds that the record in this case contained sufficient evidence to enable the ALJ to make a RFC determination notwithstanding the absence of a physical assessment by a medical doctor, and that the ALJ fulfilled his duty to review all of the record evidence in determining Plaintiff's RFC. In finding that Plaintiff can perform light work, the ALJ assigned determinative weight to the opinion evidence from Plaintiff's treating physicians, Dr. Ruan and Dr. Revels. (Tr. 31-32). A review of the record reflects that while neither completed a Physical Capacities Assessment, both opined that Plaintiff could return to work. (Id. at 226, 267). In a letter to Plaintiff's employer dated May 12, 2007, Dr. Ruan advised that Plaintiff was on Ultram ER and Lortab for severe pain symptoms, that the medication keeps her functional, and that she denies any side effects from the medication. Dr. Ruan opined that Plaintiff could return to her truck driver position, which is classified as medium work. (Id.) Similarly, Dr. Revels opined that as long as Plaintiff used lidocaine patches while working, and saved her pain medication and muscle relaxers for use after work, she could return to work. (Id.) Further, at the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she works part-time, five days a week, as a housekeeper at a motel, which is also classified as medium work. (Id. at 40-41). Plaintiff also testified that she is able to take care of her personal needs and perform some household chores. (Id. at 52-53). This substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC determination even in the absence of a physical assessment by a physician. Accordingly, Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred in developing her RFC is without merit.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record by not ordering a consultative orthopedic exam. The Commissioner responds that Social Security Regulations only require that a consultative examination be ordered when the medical and non-medical evidence is insufficient or inadequate for the ALJ to make a determination on Plaintiff's claims.
As indicated above, a claimant bears the burden of proving disability and for producing evidence in support of his claim while the ALJ has "a basic duty to develop a full and fair record." Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1276; Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269. In fulfilling the duty to conduct a full and fair inquiry, the ALJ is not required to order a consultative examination unless the record establishes that such is
It is only where a consultative examination is necessary for the ALJ to make a decision due to some conflict, ambiguity, or other insufficiency in the medical evidence that the regulations require an ALJ to order a consultative examination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(a)(2) ("When we purchase a consultative examination, we will use the report from the consultative examination to try to resolve a conflict or ambiguity if one exists. We will also use a consultative examination to secure needed medical evidence the file does not contain such as clinical findings, laboratory tests, a diagnosis or prognosis necessary for decision."), 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(b) ("A consultative examination may be purchased when the evidence as a whole, both medical and nonmedical, is not sufficient to support a decision on your claim."); see also Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir.1997) ("The Secretary has broad latitude in ordering consultative examinations.").
In this case, Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ lacked sufficient evidence upon which to make an informed decision regarding Plaintiff's limitations is incorrect. The ALJ had sufficient evidence before her to accurately assess Plaintiff's impairments. The ALJ provided a thorough analysis of Plaintiff's medical treatment including the treatment under both Drs. Revels and Ruan. Additionally, the record contains the results of a number of MRIs and X-rays, none of which identified any significant problems after Plaintiff's fusion surgery in 2005. Also, Plaintiff testified that she was currently working part-time approximately five days a week as a housekeeper, which is medium unskilled employment, and that she is able to care for her personal needs, drive, and perform some housework. In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the evidence before the ALJ was sufficient to allow her to render an informed decision. Thus, the ALJ was not required to order a consultative orthopedic examination, and accordingly, Plaintiff's claim that the ALJ failed to develop the record must fail.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her subjective complaints of disabling pain.
The ALJ must consider all of a claimant's statements about her symptoms, including pain
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir.2002). See also Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1991); Hoffman v. Astrue, 259 Fed.Appx. 213 (11th Cir.Fla.2007).
Even if a plaintiff meets the pain standard, the analysis does not end there. The ALJ must then turn to the question of the credibility of the plaintiff's subjective complaints. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; Reliford v. Barnhart, 444 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1189 n. 1 (N.D.Ala.2006) (The pain standard "is designed to be a threshold determination made prior to considering the plaintiff's credibility."). When evaluating a claim based on disabling subjective symptoms, the ALJ considers medical findings, a claimant's statements, statements by the treating physician, and evidence of how the pain affects the claimant's daily activities and ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a).
Credibility determinations are within the province of the ALJ. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). However, where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant's testimony about pain, the ALJ must articulate "explicit and adequate reasons" for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the credibility finding. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.2005). See also Jones v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1991).
(Id. at 30-31).
The undersigned finds that the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. As observed by the ALJ, both of Plaintiff's treating physicians opined that she is capable of working as long as she does not take pain medications and muscle relaxers while at work. Plaintiff also reported to her physicians that she wanted to return to work and that she would utilize lidocaine patches while at work, and reserve her pain medications for use at home. (Id. at 226, 265). Additionally, as noted supra, Plaintiff testified that she works part-time cleaning hotel rooms,
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence and concludes that the ALJ's reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's testimony were clearly articulated in the decision. As noted above, this Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment but must accept the factual findings of the Commissioner where they are supported by substantial evidence and based upon the proper legal standards. Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir.1985).
For the reasons set forth above, and upon careful consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the parties, it is hereby
